Top Risks

• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through ironproxy.space and app.myxavpn.pro — unknown, untrusted endpoints
• Install URL hijack opens ironproxy.space on install; dev is anonymous gmail account with no verified identity
• Privacy policy is Google's generic account policy — completely unscoped to this extension, admitting data collection and 3rd-party sharing
• No developer name, free-webmail identity, no verified publisher: near-zero accountability for proxy traffic interception
• JS external hosts include ironproxy.space (RU/NL geo) and t.me (Telegram), suggesting covert C2 or operator contact channel

Evidence

• proxy_permission_high_risk manifest proxy declared — can silently redirect all browser traffic through ironproxy.space/app.myxavpn.pro with no user visibility.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://ironproxy.space/ — unknown third-party site, monetization/C2 redirect pattern.
• anonymous_developer store developer_name empty, dev email is asdro1905@gmail.com (free webmail numbered alias), no verified publisher.
• generic_google_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is myaccount.google.com/privacypolicy — Google's own policy, not scoped to this extension at all.
• external_js_hosts_suspicious crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, ironproxy.space (RU/NL), t.me. Non-VPN host t.me suggests Telegram C2 or operator link.
• small_install_high_perm_anomaly api Only 42 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — classic tail-attack-surface pattern.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default CSP applies but no extension-specific hardening.
• geo_diversity_ru_nl crx JS hosts span NL and RU jurisdictions — RU endpoint for a proxy extension raises interception risk.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows routing ALL browser traffic through attacker-controlled endpoints; critical capability for a VPN with unknown dev.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping