Top Risks

• proxy permission lets developer silently reroute ALL browser traffic through cipherway.space (RU-hosted).
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy — not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing.
• Developer is anonymous (no name, free-webmail only); install_url_hijack opens cipherway.space on install.
• External JS hosts include app.getmyxa.com and t.me — unrelated to VPN function, no CSP to constrain them.
• Only 20 installs with a high-impact permission (proxy) — tail attack surface / minimal vetting signal.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — full traffic rerouting capability to cipherway.space (NL/RU geo).
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://cipherway.space/ — third-party URL hijack on install.
• generic_privacy_policy store Policy URL is Google's own account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• anonymous_developer store developer_name empty, free-webmail email namikkm13@gmail.com, no verified publisher badge.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.getmyxa.com, cipherway.space, t.me — 3 distinct domains, no CSP to restrict.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but external host contact is unrestricted.
• small_install_high_perm api Only 20 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface anomaly flagged.
• geo_diversity crx JS served from NL and RU — dual-country hosting for a VPN with anonymous developer raises concern.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Reroutes all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; highest-impact single permission.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping