Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — WAEVA [credential-theft] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• Privacy policy is Google's generic account policy — not scoped to this extension or its data practices.
• Developer uses free Gmail; no business identity or domain verified.
• Access to web.whatsapp.com allows reading sensitive chat data via scripting.
• No developer name listed in store; accountability gap.

Evidence

• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true — scores +10.0.
• developer_identity store Gmail developer email, empty developer_name, no business domain. Reputation pillar elevated.
• verified_publisher store verified_publisher=true; -3.0 discount applied to reputation, floored at 2.0 per hard-floor rule.
• host_permissions_narrow manifest Host access limited to *://web.whatsapp.com/* only; not broad.
• external_js_host crx js_external_hosts=['sheetjs.com']; third-party JS dependency, no bad-host hit recorded.
• no_csp manifest csp_present=false on MV3; MV3 has strict defaults so no +2.0 MV2 penalty applies.
• code_clean crx code_findings_raw=[], obfuscation_score=0.0; no code quality risk detected.
• maintenance_current store months_since_update=3; maintenance pillar=0.0 (<=3 months).
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — WAEVA [credential-theft] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 3.04 -> 5.54 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• tabs medium Can read tab URLs and metadata; scoped to whatsapp.com context.
• storage low Local key-value storage; low standalone risk.
• scripting medium Can inject scripts; mitigated by narrow host_permissions to web.whatsapp.com.
• downloads medium Can trigger file downloads; plausible for WhatsApp media export use case.
• *://web.whatsapp.com/* medium Host access limited to WhatsApp Web; still touches sensitive chat data.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping