Top Risks

• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through gusentun.space, a dev-controlled domain with no business transparency
• install URL hijack on onInstalled opens third-party site gusentun.space — classic monetization/tracking shell pattern
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy — not scoped to this extension; data_collection=true and third_party_sharing=true admitted
• Free-webmail developer (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — unaccountable identity
• 65 installs + HIGH permission (proxy) flagged as tail-attack-surface anomaly; very low visibility for such a powerful capability

Evidence

• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://gusentun.space — third-party domain, monetization/tracking indicator.
• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; all browser traffic can be tunneled through attacker-chosen server.
• js_external_host crx gusentun.space is sole external JS host — same domain as install hijack target, single-operator control.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_devname store Developer email sedatkilli87@gmail.com, no developer name, no verified publisher badge.
• install_perm_anomaly api 65 installs with HIGH-tier permission (proxy); small_install_high_perm=true.
• csp_absent_mv3 manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit CSP hardening.
• host_geo api All JS hosted in RU (Russia); single country, aligns with stated bypass-of-Russian-blocks use-case but unverifiable.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can reroute all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; fundamental VPN/proxy capability but high abuse potential.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping