Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Salut Vpn – Secure Proxy [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission routes ALL browser traffic through developer-controlled servers with no accountability.
• Privacy policy URL returns fetch error; policy effectively non-existent and unverifiable.
• Gmail developer email with no developer name and no verified publisher badge.
• External JS host myxavpn.com is the same domain as the inaccessible privacy policy — single unverified operator controls both.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — redirects all browser network traffic through extension-controlled endpoints.
• privacy_policy_fetch_failed api https://myxavpn.com/privacy/ returned HTTPError; policy content unverifiable, scored as not fetched.
• free_webmail_developer store Developer email silviaferr79@gmail.com is Gmail; no developer name listed; no verified publisher.
• external_js_host crx js_external_hosts: [myxavpn.com] — same domain as privacy policy; single unverified operator.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 applies default CSP so no v2 network penalty, but no explicit policy.
• geo_diversity_low api Single JS host country: FI (Finland). No geo-diversity penalty triggered (count=1).
• maintenance_3_6mo store months_since_update=6; falls in 3-6 month band (+1.5).
• no_code_findings crx code_findings_raw empty, obfuscation_score=0.0; code quality pillar = 0.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Salut Vpn – Secure Proxy [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 5.08 -> 7.58 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Routes all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers; core VPN function but highest-impact permission.
• storage low Local data persistence for settings; low standalone risk.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping