Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Pr Assistant [data-theft] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• Free-webmail dev (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — unverifiable identity.
• GitHub brand impersonation flagged; developer not a confirmed GitHub owner.
• Privacy policy on free hosting (GitHub Pages) with data_collection=true and third_party_sharing=true but no retention disclosure.
• AI extension contacts aistudio.google.com — page content may be sent to external AI API.

Evidence

• free_webmail_dev_no_name store Developer email is gmail; developer_name is empty; no verified publisher badge.
• brand_impersonation_github store brand_mention.is_impersonation=true for 'github'; confirmed_owner=false; dev domain is gmail.com.
• ai_extension_external_host manifest js_external_hosts includes aistudio.google.com; AI processes GitHub PR page content externally.
• privacy_policy_third_party_sharing api Policy fetched; scope_extension=true, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true, retention=false.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit CSP declared.
• very_low_install_count store Only 8 installs; zero ratings; no community trust signal.
• no_code_findings crx code_findings_raw empty; obfuscation_score 0.0; 8 JS files scanned.
• no_cve_findings crx cve_findings_raw empty; no vulnerable bundled libraries detected.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Pr Assistant [data-theft] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 3.30 -> 5.80 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• storage low Stores local config/settings; no exfiltration path alone.
• activeTab medium Grants transient access to current tab on user action; scoped but can read page content.
• https://github.com/* medium Host permission scoped to GitHub only; matches stated PR-assistant function.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping