Top Risks

• proxy permission routes ALL browser traffic through developer-controlled endpoints including unknown silashield.space
• Privacy policy is Google's generic account policy — completely unscoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing
• Free-webmail dev (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher, ultra-low installs (5) with high-capability permission
• install_url_hijack=true: extension opens a third-party URL on install without disclosed target
• JS contacts silashield.space and t.me — unknown Russian/foreign endpoints not justified by declared VPN function

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can redirect all browser TCP connections to arbitrary server.
• install_url_hijack crx install_url_hijack=true; target unknown — extension redirects browser on install.
• unknown_external_hosts crx JS contacts silashield.space (RU-hosted) and t.me not justified by VPN description.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy is Google account privacy page: scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• no_developer_name store developer_name is empty; email is free-webmail gmail; no verified publisher badge.
• tail_attack_surface api install_perm_anomaly: 5 installs + proxy HIGH permission = small-install high-perm anomaly.
• geo_diversity api JS hosts span 4 countries (CA, NL, RU, US); RU-hosted silashield.space raises concern.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 strict default applies but no explicit CSP declared.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Full proxy control: can intercept/redirect all browser traffic to arbitrary endpoints.
• host: https://cloudflare-dns.com/* low Legitimate DNS-over-HTTPS endpoint; consistent with VPN/DNS function.
• host: https://dns.google/* low Legitimate DNS-over-HTTPS endpoint; consistent with VPN/DNS function.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping