Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Vpn Urban Proxy [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission allows full traffic interception/rerouting through skorostvpn.space (RU-hosted domain).
• Privacy policy is Google's generic account policy — not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing.
• Free-webmail developer (gmail) with no developer name, no verified publisher, no business website.
• Install URL hijack opens skorostvpn.space on installation — third-party redirect on an unknown Russian-hosted domain.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can silently redirect all browser traffic to skorostvpn.space (RU geo).
• install_url_hijack store install_url_hijack=true targeting https://skorostvpn.space/ on install.
• free_webmail_dev_no_name store Developer silviaferr79@gmail.com, no developer_name, no verified publisher, no business site.
• generic_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google account policy — scope_extension=false, admits data_collection and third_party_sharing.
• js_external_hosts crx Contacts cloudflare-dns.com, dns.google, skorostvpn.space — 3 distinct domains, one in RU geo.
• small_install_high_perm api install_perm_anomaly: 188 installs + proxy permission = tail attack surface.
• host_geo_diversity crx JS hosts span CA, RU, US — Russian-hosted VPN endpoint raises traffic interception risk.
• no_csp manifest csp_present=false on MV3; +2.0 network per v2 calibration rule (b).
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Vpn Urban Proxy [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 4.37 -> 6.87 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can reroute all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers; critical capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping