Top Risks

• Free-webmail developer (silviaferr79@gmail.com) with no business identity or verified publisher status for a proxy/VPN extension.
• Install-URL hijack opens cloudmask.space — a third-party domain unrelated to any legitimate VPN brand.
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy; not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and third-party sharing.
• JS communicates with app.myxavpn.pro, cloudmask.space, and t.me — three external hosts spanning NL and RU, none verifiably controlled by developer.
• proxy permission with only 16 installs and a free-webmail dev is a classic tail-attack surface pattern.

Evidence

• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://cloudmask.space/ — third-party domain, unrelated to stated VPN brand.
• free_webmail_dev_no_name store Developer email silviaferr79@gmail.com; developer_name empty; no business website.
• generic_google_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google account policy (scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true).
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, cloudmask.space, t.me — 3 distinct domains across NL/RU geos.
• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; enables full traffic interception and rerouting through arbitrary servers.
• small_install_high_perm api Only 16 installs with a HIGH-tier permission (proxy); tail-attack-surface anomaly flagged.
• geo_diversity crx JS hosts span NL and RU (2 countries). Russian-hosted endpoints raise routing-trust concern for proxy category.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 provides some default protection but no explicit CSP declared.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows full control over browser network routing; can redirect all traffic through attacker-controlled servers.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping