Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Дядя Ваня VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission allows full traffic interception via horizonguard.space and app.myxavpn.pro (NL/RU hosted)
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy — not scoped to this extension, admits data collection & 3rd-party sharing
• install_url_hijack redirects to horizonguard.space on install — unsolicited navigation to unverified domain
• Free-webmail dev (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — identity completely unverifiable

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can silently redirect all browser traffic to attacker-controlled endpoints.
• install_url_hijack store onInstalled opens https://horizonguard.space/ — unsolicited redirect to unverified third-party domain.
• js_external_hosts crx Extension contacts app.myxavpn.pro, horizonguard.space (RU/NL), and t.me — unverified external infra.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google's own account privacy page; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• developer_identity store dev email aslikap21@gmail.com (free webmail), no developer name, no verified publisher badge.
• small_install_high_perm api Only 9 installs with proxy (HIGH) permission — install_perm_anomaly.small_install_high_perm=true.
• geo_diversity crx JS hosts span NL and RU — two countries; moderate geo spread for a VPN with no verified operator.
• csp_absent manifest content_security_policy is null; no CSP protection despite MV3 (MV3 has strict default but no explicit extension CSP).
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Дядя Ваня VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 5.44 -> 7.94 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can reroute all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers; highest-impact VPN permission.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping