Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Radmin VPN — Быстрый доступ [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers (primeproxy.space, app.myxavpn.pro)
• Install URL hijack opens primeproxy.space on install — classic monetization/phishing shell pattern
• Privacy policy is Google's own policy, not scoped to this extension; admits collection and 3rd-party sharing
• Developer uses free Gmail, no developer name, no business identity — unaccountable operator

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; routes all browser HTTP/HTTPS traffic through extension-controlled servers.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://primeproxy.space/ — third-party monetization site, shell pattern.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, primeproxy.space, t.me — proxy backends outside dev control.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google's own account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_dev_name store Developer email sedatkilli87@gmail.com; developer_name empty; no verified publisher.
• brand_impersonation_risk store Title uses 'Radmin VPN' — Famatech's registered product — but confirmed_owner=false.
• host_geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU (2 countries); RU-hosted proxy infra raises jurisdiction risk.
• no_csp manifest csp_present=false; MV3 default CSP applies but no explicit policy hardening declared.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Radmin VPN — Быстрый доступ [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 4.59 -> 7.09 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can reroute all browser traffic through arbitrary servers; full network interception capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping