Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Happ VPN — Лёгкий старт [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through primeproxy.space/app.myxavpn.pro — unverified Russian/Dutch infrastructure
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy, not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and third-party sharing
• install_url_hijack opens primeproxy.space on install — classic traffic-monetization pattern
• Developer is free-webmail (gmail) with no name, no verified publisher status, extremely low installs (19)

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; VPN category discount applies but dev is unverified gmail account with no business domain.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://primeproxy.space/ — monetization/traffic-capture pattern.
• generic_privacy_policy store Policy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_name store Developer email sedatkilli87@gmail.com, no developer name listed, not verified publisher.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, primeproxy.space, t.me — unverified proxy infra + Telegram.
• host_geo_diversity api Hosts span NL and RU; Russian-hosted proxy infra raises interception risk.
• small_install_high_perm store Only 19 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface anomaly.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 provides some default protection but no explicit policy declared.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Happ VPN — Лёгкий старт [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 5.51 -> 8.01 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows rerouting all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; critical for a VPN shell.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping