Top Risks

• proxy permission lets developer reroute ALL browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers (app.myxavpn.pro, cloudmask.space)
• install_url_hijack opens cloudmask.space on install — unknown third-party domain
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy, completely unscoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing
• Gmail dev with no developer name, tiny install base (14), high-capability permission — classic tail-attack surface
• External JS hosts span NL and RU jurisdictions; extension contacts t.me (Telegram) and myxavpn.pro

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — full reroute of all browser HTTP/S traffic to dev-controlled endpoints.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://cloudmask.space/ — same domain as external JS host, unknown operator.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, cloudmask.space, t.me — 3 distinct domains across NL+RU.
• generic_privacy_policy store Policy URL is Google's account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_dev_no_name store Developer email kameqoko032@gmail.com, no developer name listed, no business website.
• small_install_high_perm api Only 14 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — install_perm_anomaly confirmed.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; csp_present=false on MV3 extension contacting external hosts.
• russian_description store Manifest description in Russian; external host myxavpn.pro hosted in RU — geo risk for proxy traffic.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Full browser proxy control; routes all traffic through attacker-chosen server.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping