Top Risks

• Privacy policy fetched but scope_extension=false and admits data_collection+third_party_sharing — generic corporate policy, not extension-scoped (Privacy=10.0).
• Broad host permissions (http://*/*, https://*/*) combined with cookies permission enables access to session tokens on every site visited.
• AI writing assistant reads text from all websites including sensitive/confidential content on all 38M installs.
• Three innerHTML DOM-XSS sinks in production JS — CSP present mitigates but does not eliminate risk from page-content injection.
• No verified publisher badge and developer_name empty — despite grammarly.com domain, formal publisher verification absent.

Evidence

• broad_host_permissions manifest http://*/* and https://*/* grant content-script injection on every site; cookies permission amplifies to session-token risk.
• privacy_policy_not_extension_scoped crx policy fetched, scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true — triggers +10.0 privacy (v3.5 rule D).
• dom_xss_sinks crx 3 innerHTML findings in vendors+inkwell chunks; CSP present (script-src 'self') reduces exploitation path but sinks exist.
• ai_extension_page_content store AI writing assistant processes text on all visited pages; +2.5 AI webstore signal applied.
• no_verified_publisher store verified_publisher=false, developer_name empty; is_featured_by_google=true reduces reputation risk partially.
• cookies_high_perm manifest cookies + <all_urls> host access is HIGH×1.2 multiplier surface.
• connect_src_broad crx CSP connect-src lists 40+ endpoints including S3, Iterable, Superhuman, CloudFront — diverse external connectivity.
• react_17_bundled crx React 17.0.2 bundled; no CVEs found in cve_findings_raw, no score impact.

Permissions Breakdown

• scripting medium Can inject JS into pages; paired with broad host_permissions amplifies risk.
• sidePanel low UI surface only, low direct risk.
• tabs medium Access to tab URLs and metadata across all open tabs.
• notifications low Can display notifications; limited abuse surface.
• cookies high Read/write cookies; combined with broad host access enables session token access.
• identity medium OAuth token access; scoped but can expose user identity.
• storage low Local extension storage only.
• http://*/* high Broad host permission — content scripts run on all HTTP sites.
• https://*/* high Broad host permission — content scripts run on all HTTPS sites, including banking/email.

Pillar Scores

Scoring History

Bookkeeping