AI Webcam Effects + Recorder: Google Meet, Zoom, Discord & Other Meetings
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Risk Score
5.21
Risk Level:
Medium
Recommendation:
🟡 MEDIUM RISK — review
Top Risks
- browsingData + scripting + <all_urls>: can read/modify every page and delete user browsing data.
- Privacy policy fetched but scope_extension=false with data_collection+third_party_sharing=true: admits broad data sharing without scoping to this extension (+10.0).
- Brand impersonation: mentions Google, Zoom, Discord without confirmed ownership; is_impersonation=true.
- Description promises recording but lacks tabCapture/desktopCapture — permission/feature mismatch raises shell-pattern suspicion.
- No CSP (MV3 so no +2.0 network penalty, but no script-src protection for 4 external JS hosts).
Evidence
- broad_host_permissions manifest host_permissions=[http://*/*, https://*/*] + content_scripts <all_urls> + scripting = full-page read/write on every site.
- browsingData_permission manifest browsingData declared; can erase cookies, history, cache — destructive capability mismatched to webcam-effects use case.
- privacy_policy_scope_mismatch api Policy fetched; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true. Policy does not scope collection to this extension.
- brand_impersonation store brands_mentioned=[zoom, google, discord], confirmed_owner=false, is_impersonation=true per brand_mention classifier.
- description_permission_mismatch store Promises recording but no tabCapture or desktopCapture in manifest; functional promise cannot be fulfilled.
- no_developer_name store developer_name is empty string; verified_publisher=true and is_featured=true partially mitigate.
- external_js_hosts crx 4 external JS hosts: fonts.googleapis.com, fonts.gstatic.com, vuejs.org, webcameffects.app. No CSP present.
- verified_publisher_featured store verified_publisher=true, is_featured_by_google=true; partially reduces reputation risk but does not resolve permission/privacy concerns.
Permissions Breakdown
- tabs medium Exposes URL/title of all tabs; combined with broad host access increases surveillance surface.
- activeTab low Scoped to user-invoked tab; lower risk but redundant given scripting+host_permissions.
- scripting high Allows arbitrary JS injection into any page via host_permissions <all_urls>.
- storage low Local data persistence; low standalone risk.
- declarativeNetRequest medium Can block/redirect network requests; less risky than webRequest but still significant.
- browsingData high Can delete cookies, cache, history across all time ranges — destructive/exfil potential.
- http://*/* high Broad host access enabling content-script injection and data reads on all HTTP sites.
- https://*/* high Broad host access on all HTTPS sites; paired with scripting this is maximum reach.
- <all_urls> (content_scripts) high Content scripts injected into every page the user visits; high surveillance/exfil surface.
Pillar Scores
Permissions8.00
Reputation3.50
Network3.50
Webstore6.50
Maintenance0.00
Privacy10.00
Code Quality0.00
CVE Exposure0.00
Bookkeeping
Rubric v3.6
Scored at 2026-08-28 10:48
Listing SHA
8b3943477be3…
Force block
— not fired
Score recovered
no
Elapsed
—