Netskope Extension Risk

Detail view · rubric v3.6
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AI Webcam Effects + Recorder: Google Meet, Zoom, Discord & Other Meetings

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Risk Score
5.21
Risk Level: Medium
Recommendation: 🟡 MEDIUM RISK — review
Category AI
Installs 30,000
Rating 3.7
Last updated 2026-08-02
Manifest version MV3
CSP present ❌ no
Developer contact@webcameffects.app
Verified publisher ✅ yes
Featured by Google ✅ yes
Privacy policy link
Web Store open ↗

Top Risks

  • browsingData + scripting + <all_urls>: can read/modify every page and delete user browsing data.
  • Privacy policy fetched but scope_extension=false with data_collection+third_party_sharing=true: admits broad data sharing without scoping to this extension (+10.0).
  • Brand impersonation: mentions Google, Zoom, Discord without confirmed ownership; is_impersonation=true.
  • Description promises recording but lacks tabCapture/desktopCapture — permission/feature mismatch raises shell-pattern suspicion.
  • No CSP (MV3 so no +2.0 network penalty, but no script-src protection for 4 external JS hosts).

Evidence

  • broad_host_permissions manifest host_permissions=[http://*/*, https://*/*] + content_scripts <all_urls> + scripting = full-page read/write on every site.
  • browsingData_permission manifest browsingData declared; can erase cookies, history, cache — destructive capability mismatched to webcam-effects use case.
  • privacy_policy_scope_mismatch api Policy fetched; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true. Policy does not scope collection to this extension.
  • brand_impersonation store brands_mentioned=[zoom, google, discord], confirmed_owner=false, is_impersonation=true per brand_mention classifier.
  • description_permission_mismatch store Promises recording but no tabCapture or desktopCapture in manifest; functional promise cannot be fulfilled.
  • no_developer_name store developer_name is empty string; verified_publisher=true and is_featured=true partially mitigate.
  • external_js_hosts crx 4 external JS hosts: fonts.googleapis.com, fonts.gstatic.com, vuejs.org, webcameffects.app. No CSP present.
  • verified_publisher_featured store verified_publisher=true, is_featured_by_google=true; partially reduces reputation risk but does not resolve permission/privacy concerns.

Permissions Breakdown

  • tabs medium Exposes URL/title of all tabs; combined with broad host access increases surveillance surface.
  • activeTab low Scoped to user-invoked tab; lower risk but redundant given scripting+host_permissions.
  • scripting high Allows arbitrary JS injection into any page via host_permissions <all_urls>.
  • storage low Local data persistence; low standalone risk.
  • declarativeNetRequest medium Can block/redirect network requests; less risky than webRequest but still significant.
  • browsingData high Can delete cookies, cache, history across all time ranges — destructive/exfil potential.
  • http://*/* high Broad host access enabling content-script injection and data reads on all HTTP sites.
  • https://*/* high Broad host access on all HTTPS sites; paired with scripting this is maximum reach.
  • <all_urls> (content_scripts) high Content scripts injected into every page the user visits; high surveillance/exfil surface.

Pillar Scores

Permissions8.00
Reputation3.50
Network3.50
Webstore6.50
Maintenance0.00
Privacy10.00
Code Quality0.00
CVE Exposure0.00

Bookkeeping

Rubric v3.6
Scored at 2026-08-28 10:48
Listing SHA 8b3943477be3…
Force block — not fired
Score recovered no
Elapsed