Netskope Extension Risk

Detail view · rubric v3.6
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Proton ВПН-Мгновенное соединение

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Risk Score
4.61
Risk Level: Medium
Recommendation: 🚫 BLOCK
Category VPN
Installs 11
Rating 5.0
Last updated 2026-06-27 (3 months ago)
Manifest version MV3
CSP present ❌ no
Developer kameqoko032@gmail.com
Verified publisher ❌ no
Featured by Google ❌ no
Privacy policy link
Web Store open ↗

Top Risks

  • proxy permission lets extension silently route ALL browser traffic through unknown servers (app.myxavpn.pro, silashield.space)
  • Free-webmail dev (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — anonymous actor with critical capability
  • Privacy policy is Google's own policy (scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true) — unscoped and misleading
  • install_url_hijack=true: extension opens 3rd-party URL on install — onboarding traffic monetization or phishing risk
  • JS external hosts include silashield.space and t.me alongside VPN infra — suspicious non-VPN endpoints

Evidence

  • proxy_permission_high_risk manifest proxy declared — can intercept and redirect all browser network traffic to attacker-controlled hosts.
  • anonymous_free_webmail_dev store dev email kameqoko032@gmail.com (numbered alias), developer_name empty, no verified publisher, no business domain.
  • brand_impersonation_proton store Title uses 'Proton' brand but confirmed_owner=false and not a Proton-affiliated publisher.
  • install_url_hijack crx install_url_hijack=true: extension opens 3rd-party URL on install.
  • suspicious_js_external_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, silashield.space, t.me — unrelated to declared DNS hosts; silashield.space is opaque.
  • generic_google_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google's own account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
  • geo_diversity_4_countries api JS hosts span CA, NL, RU, US — 4 countries including RU; unusual for a minimal VPN extension.
  • small_install_high_perm_anomaly store Only 11 installs with proxy (HIGH) permission — tail attack surface / test-phase malware pattern.

Permissions Breakdown

  • proxy high Can redirect all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers; critical capability for a VPN impostor.
  • host: https://cloudflare-dns.com/* medium DNS-over-HTTPS access; legitimate for VPN/proxy but grants network observation capability.
  • host: https://dns.google/* medium DNS-over-HTTPS access; same reasoning as above.

Pillar Scores

Permissions7.50
Reputation8.50
Network5.50
Webstore5.00
Maintenance0.00
Privacy10.00
Code Quality0.00
CVE Exposure0.00

Bookkeeping

Rubric v3.6
Scored at 2026-09-02 13:28
Listing SHA f491c4712a5e…
Force block — not fired
Score recovered no
Elapsed