Top Risks

• proxy permission routes ALL browser traffic through pauktun.space — unknown Russian host under gmail dev with no accountability.
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy (scope_extension=false, admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing) — worst-case privacy signal.
• install_url_hijack opens pauktun.space on install; extension contacts external host with no disclosed purpose.
• Developer is anonymous (no name, free-webmail only, no business website) — no accountability for proxy infrastructure.
• Small install count (120) + HIGH proxy permission = tail attack surface with disproportionate capability.

Evidence

• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://pauktun.space/ — same host as js_external_hosts; unknown Russian domain.
• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; all browser traffic can be intercepted/redirected by extension operator.
• generic_privacy_policy store Policy URL is Google's own policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true — D rule (v3.5) → +10.0.
• anonymous_developer store developer_name empty, free-webmail gmail, no verified publisher, no business domain.
• external_host_pauktun.space crx Single Russian-geolocated JS host; no bad_host_hits but unvetted proxy backend.
• install_perm_anomaly api small_install_high_perm=true: 120 installs + proxy (HIGH tier).
• csp_absent_mv3 manifest content_security_policy null; MV3 has strict default but no explicit CSP declared.
• no_code_findings crx obfuscation_score=0, code_findings_raw empty; static scan found nothing, but proxy backend is opaque.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows rerouting all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; critical for VPN/surveillance abuse.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping