Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Ваня дядя VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through echosecure.space — a single unknown RU-hosted server with no verifiable operator.
• Privacy policy is Google's own account policy — entirely unscoped to this extension, admits data collection and third-party sharing.
• Install URL hijack opens echosecure.space on install; extension contacts same external host in JS.
• Developer is anonymous (no name, free Gmail, no business domain) with only 42 installs — tail-attack surface.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — extension can redirect all browser TCP connections through an arbitrary server.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://echosecure.space/ — same domain as the sole JS external host.
• js_external_host crx echosecure.space is the only external JS host; also the proxy backend candidate.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true → +10.0.
• anonymous_developer store developer_name empty, free Gmail dev email, no business domain, not verified, not featured.
• small_install_high_perm api 42 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — install_perm_anomaly.small_install_high_perm=true.
• geo_single_ru crx All JS external hosts resolve to RU; no CDN diversity.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy null; MV3 default applies but no explicit CSP declared.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Ваня дядя VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 5.27 -> 7.77 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Routes all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; full traffic interception capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping