Top Risks

• proxy permission lets developer silently redirect ALL browser traffic through bezopasnet.space (RU-hosted domain).
• Install URL hijack opens third-party bezopasnet.space on install — classic traffic-monetization / C2 enrollment pattern.
• Privacy policy is Google's own policy — completely unscoped to this extension; no disclosure of what VPN data is collected.
• Free-webmail developer (namikkm13@gmail.com), no developer name, no verified publisher — zero accountability.
• JS external hosts include app.myxavpn.pro and bezopasnet.space (NL+RU geo) — unknown backend proxy operators.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest Extension declares 'proxy' — can intercept and redirect all Chrome network traffic to arbitrary servers.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://bezopasnet.space/ — third-party Russian domain, monetization/C2 enrollment risk.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, bezopasnet.space, t.me — three distinct domains including RU/NL infrastructure.
• generic_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google Account policy — not scoped to extension; data_collection+third_party_sharing admitted per classifier.
• no_developer_name store developer_name is empty; email is free Gmail; no verified publisher badge; no business identity.
• tiny_install_high_perm api Only 13 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface anomaly flagged.
• geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU — two countries; RU jurisdiction raises data-sovereignty concern for a VPN.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but combined with external hosts increases network risk.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can redirect all browser traffic through attacker-controlled proxy servers.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping