Top Risks

• proxy permission allows full MITM of all browser traffic via attacker-controlled server app.getmyxa.com
• Privacy policy is Google's generic account policy — not scoped to this extension at all (scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true)
• Free-webmail developer (gmail) with no developer name and no verified publisher — accountability near-zero
• install_url_hijack=true: extension opens third-party URL on install, indicating monetization or tracking intent
• JS external hosts include app.getmyxa.com (unknown) and t.me (Telegram), geo-diversity NL+RU for a VPN raises routing-trust concern

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — capable of redirecting all browser traffic through any server the extension chooses.
• install_url_hijack store install_url_hijack=true; extension fires onInstalled redirect to 3rd-party URL, classic monetization/tracking signal.
• privacy_policy_generic store PP URL is Google account policy (479K chars); scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true — not extension-specific.
• developer_identity store Developer name empty, email vale99505@gmail.com (free webmail, numbered alias pattern), no verified publisher.
• js_external_hosts crx Extension contacts app.getmyxa.com and t.me — unknown proxy backend + Telegram, no CSP to constrain them.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit restriction on external script sources.
• small_install_high_perm store Only 36 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface anomaly flagged by install_perm_anomaly.
• host_geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU (country_count=2); RU-hosted proxy backend warrants additional routing-trust scrutiny.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Routes all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; critical MITM capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping