Top Risks

• proxy permission lets developer route ALL browser traffic through skorostvpn.space, a third-party domain with no disclosed ownership.
• Brand impersonation: extension names YouTube brand but developer (gmail) is unconfirmed owner; misleads users.
• Privacy policy is Google's own policy (myaccount.google.com), not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing.
• Install URL hijack opens skorostvpn.space on install, a 3rd-party ad/monetization target not the extension itself.
• Free-webmail developer (vale99505@gmail.com), no developer name, no business website — no accountability.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; extension can silently redirect all browser traffic to skorostvpn.space.
• install_url_hijack store install_url_target=https://skorostvpn.space/ — 3rd-party domain opened on install.
• brand_impersonation store brand_mention.is_impersonation=true for 'youtube'; developer not confirmed owner of that brand.
• generic_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google's own policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_devname store developer_email=vale99505@gmail.com, developer_name empty; no verifiable business identity.
• small_install_high_perm store Only 14 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface with disproportionate capability.
• js_external_host_skorostvpn crx skorostvpn.space appears in js_external_hosts; unknown throwaway domain serves JS or proxy config.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit CSP tightening declared.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Full proxy control can intercept and redirect all browser traffic to attacker-controlled servers.
• host: https://cloudflare-dns.com/* low DNS-over-HTTPS lookup endpoint; expected for a VPN/proxy extension.
• host: https://dns.google/* low DNS-over-HTTPS lookup endpoint; expected for a VPN/proxy extension.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping