Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Батя VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission allows full traffic interception and redirection through unverified horizonguard.space infrastructure
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy — does NOT scope to this extension; admits data collection and third-party sharing
• Free-webmail developer (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — identity unverifiable
• Install URL hijack opens horizonguard.space on install; external JS hosts include RU-geolocated servers

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can silently route all browser traffic through horizonguard.space or app.myxavpn.pro.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://horizonguard.space/ — 3rd-party domain, install redirect confirmed.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, horizonguard.space (NL+RU geo), t.me — multi-jurisdiction VPN infra with Telegram.
• generic_privacy_policy store Policy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_dev_name store Developer email chatlak4512@gmail.com; developer_name empty; no verified publisher badge.
• small_install_high_perm api 336 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — install_perm_anomaly.small_install_high_perm=true.
• host_geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU; RU-hosted VPN proxy endpoint raises jurisdiction concern.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; csp_present=false on MV3 extension with proxy capability.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Батя VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 4.21 -> 6.71 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can redirect all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; full network interception capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping