Top Risks

• proxy permission routes ALL browser traffic through developer-controlled servers (app.myxavpn.pro, horizonguard.space).
• Privacy policy is Google's own generic policy — not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing.
• Install URL hijack: onInstalled opens horizonguard.space, a third-party domain unknown to Chrome Web Store.
• Free-webmail dev (egositburak@gmail.com), no developer name, no verified publisher — identity unverifiable.
• Small install count (627) combined with HIGH-tier permission (proxy) is a tail-attack-surface signal.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest Permission 'proxy' declared; can redirect all browser HTTP/HTTPS traffic to arbitrary servers.
• install_url_hijack manifest onInstalled opens https://horizonguard.space/ — same domain as JS external host, 3rd-party redirect.
• external_js_hosts crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro, horizonguard.space (NL/RU geo), and t.me — 3 distinct domains.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google's own account privacy page; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_name store Developer email is egositburak@gmail.com; developer_name is empty; not verified publisher.
• host_geo_russia api JS hosts resolve to NL and RU; RU-hosted VPN proxy backend is elevated-risk for traffic interception.
• small_install_high_perm store 627 installs with proxy (HIGH) permission — install_perm_anomaly.small_install_high_perm=true.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null (MV3 default applies but no explicit policy declared).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Full proxy control: can reroute all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping