Top Risks

• proxy permission routes ALL browser traffic through stealthpath.space, a throwaway-looking domain, enabling full MITM.
• Developer is free-webmail (gmail) with no name, no verified publisher — zero accountability.
• Privacy policy is Google's own policy, not scoped to this extension at all — admits data collection/3rd-party sharing.
• Install URL hijack opens stealthpath.space on install; extension contacts app.myxavpn.pro and t.me with no explanation.
• 4 installs + HIGH-tier proxy permission = classic tail-attack-surface: low scrutiny, high capability.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can redirect all browser HTTP/S traffic to stealthpath.space or any chosen server.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://stealthpath.space/ — third-party URL hijack on install.
• free_webmail_no_dev_name store developer_email=silviaferr79@gmail.com, developer_name empty, no verified publisher.
• generic_google_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google's own account policy (scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true).
• external_host_unexplained crx JS contacts app.myxavpn.pro and t.me — neither declared in host_permissions nor explained in description.
• geo_diversity api JS hosts span 4 countries: CA, NL, RU, US — elevated for a 4-install VPN.
• small_install_high_perm store install_perm_anomaly: 4 installs + proxy permission — tail-attack-surface confirmed.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit hardening declared.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows full rerouting of all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server.
• https://stealthpath.space/* high Grants access to unknown third-party VPN backend; no corporate trust anchor.
• https://cloudflare-dns.com/* medium DoH resolver access; legitimate for VPN but adds network surface.
• https://dns.google/* medium Secondary DoH resolver; same pattern, low marginal risk on its own.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping