Top Risks

• Proxy permission routes all browser traffic; combined with unknown backend (horizonguard.space, app.myxavpn.pro) this is a surveillance risk.
• Developer is anonymous (gmail, no name, no verified publisher) — no accountability.
• Privacy policy is Google's own policy, not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing.
• Install URL hijack opens horizonguard.space on install — third-party redirect on a brand-new, 6-install extension.
• JS external hosts span NL and RU jurisdictions with unknown operators; small install count + HIGH permission = tail-attack surface.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; routes all browser traffic through extension-controlled server.
• install_url_hijack store install_url_target=https://horizonguard.space/ — opens 3rd-party on install.
• js_external_hosts crx Contacts app.myxavpn.pro, horizonguard.space, t.me — 3 distinct registrable domains.
• generic_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_dev_name store Developer email imawocigi29@gmail.com, no developer_name set, not verified publisher.
• small_install_high_perm api 6 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail-attack-surface anomaly confirmed.
• geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU (country_count=2); RU jurisdiction adds data-access risk.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit restriction on external connects.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Full proxy control routes all browser traffic through attacker-chosen servers; critical for a VPN shell.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping