Top Risks

• proxy permission enables full MITM on all browser traffic via unvetted vpnfasters.space and app.myxavpn.pro endpoints
• install_url_hijack opens vpnfasters.space on install — third-party redirect from anonymous dev
• Privacy policy is Google's own generic policy; does not scope to this extension at all (D clause: +10.0)
• Free-webmail Gmail dev, no developer name, no verified publisher — anonymous operator
• Small-install + high-perm anomaly: only 10 users, proxy permission — classic tail-attack surface

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — routes all traffic; combined with external hosts app.myxavpn.pro and vpnfasters.space.
• install_url_hijack store install_url_target=https://vpnfasters.space/ opens on install; third-party domain not controlled by dev.
• generic_google_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google's own account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true → +10.0.
• anonymous_developer store developer_name empty, free Gmail address kameqoko032@gmail.com, no verified publisher badge.
• free_webmail_no_dev_name store Gmail dev + no name → Reputation floor applies; +1.5 free-webmail, +1.0 no dev name.
• js_external_hosts crx app.myxavpn.pro (NL), vpnfasters.space, t.me — 3 distinct registrable domains, geo NL+RU.
• install_perm_anomaly api small_install_high_perm=true: 10 installs with proxy permission — tail-attack surface.
• no_csp manifest csp_present=false on MV3; v2 fix (b) not triggered on MV3 but noted for network context.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Routes all browser traffic through attacker-controlled server; full MITM capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping