Top Risks

• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through spidervpn.online — unknown Russian-hosted server with no accountable operator.
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy (scope_extension=false, admits data_collection+third_party_sharing) — worst-case policy signal (+10.0).
• Free-webmail developer (binoyihe32@gmail.com), no developer name, no verified publisher — near-maximum reputation risk.
• External JS host spidervpn.online in Russia (RU) with only 50 installs — tiny user base, high-perm: classic tail-attack-surface.
• DOM-XSS sink (innerHTML from user-controlled variable) with no CSP — elevated code quality risk.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can intercept and redirect all browser traffic through spidervpn.online.
• generic_google_privacy_policy store Privacy URL is Google account policy; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• free_webmail_no_dev_name store Developer email binoyihe32@gmail.com; developer_name is empty; no verified publisher badge.
• external_js_host_ru crx js_external_hosts: spidervpn.online hosted in RU — traffic endpoint for proxy extension.
• small_install_high_perm api install_perm_anomaly: 50 installs + HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface.
• dom_xss_sink_no_csp crx innerHTML from variable in src/servers.js; csp_present=false amplifies DOM-XSS risk.
• mv3_no_csp manifest MV3 has strict default CSP but content_security_policy explicitly null — no custom CSP declared.
• no_verified_publisher store verified_publisher=false, is_featured_by_google=false — no accountability signals.

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows rerouting all browser traffic through attacker-controlled SOCKS5 server.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping