Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Хэппи VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission allows full traffic interception and rerouting through cloudmask.space (RU/NL hosted)
• Install URL hijack opens cloudmask.space on install; extension contacts app.getmyxa.com and t.me at runtime
• Privacy policy is Google's generic policy — not scoped to this extension; admits data collection and third-party sharing
• Free-webmail developer (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — zero accountability

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared; routes all browser traffic; paired with external host cloudmask.space (RU/NL).
• install_url_hijack store onInstalled opens https://cloudmask.space/ — third-party site unrelated to chrome store listing.
• js_external_hosts crx app.getmyxa.com, cloudmask.space, t.me — 3 distinct external domains including Telegram.
• generic_privacy_policy store Policy URL is Google's own account privacy page; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• developer_identity store Free Gmail address egositburak@gmail.com, no developer name, no verified publisher badge.
• geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU (country_count=2); RU jurisdiction increases traffic-intercept risk for proxy.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default mitigates eval but no explicit script-src restriction.
• cve_findings crx No CVEs detected; no JS libraries bundled.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Хэппи VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 5.36 -> 7.86 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Can reroute all browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers; critical capability for a VPN shell.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping