Top Risks

• THREAT FEED: extension ID independently confirmed malicious by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Какаду VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry (+2.5, capped).
• proxy permission routes all browser traffic through nimbusshield.space and app.myxavpn.pro — unverified, opaque operators.
• Install URL hijack opens nimbusshield.space on install; no developer identity or business backing.
• Privacy policy is Google's own generic policy — completely unscoped to this extension, admits data collection and 3rd-party sharing.
• Free-webmail developer (gmail), no developer name, no verified publisher — zero accountability.

Evidence

• proxy_permission manifest proxy declared — can redirect all browser traffic to developer-controlled servers.
• install_url_hijack crx onInstalled opens https://nimbusshield.space/ — third-party redirect on install.
• external_js_hosts crx Contacts app.myxavpn.pro, nimbusshield.space, t.me — 3 distinct domains across NL/RU.
• privacy_policy_generic store Policy URL is Google's own account privacy page; scope_extension=false, data_collection=true, third_party_sharing=true.
• developer_identity store Developer name empty; email is free Gmail (binoyihe32@gmail.com); not verified publisher.
• small_install_high_perm api Only 6 installs with HIGH-tier proxy permission — tail attack surface anomaly.
• geo_diversity api JS hosts span NL and RU — 2 countries, opaque jurisdiction for a VPN proxy.
• no_csp manifest content_security_policy is null; MV3 default applies but no explicit policy declared.
• threat_feed_membership api Extension ID listed by TPCI chrome-mal-ids — Какаду VPN [browser-hijack] + malext.io malicious_extension_sentry; score 7.72 -> 10.00 (+2.5 cap 2.5).

Permissions Breakdown

• proxy high Allows rerouting all browser traffic through attacker-controlled proxy server — full network intercept capability.

Pillar Scores

Bookkeeping